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A THEME FROM THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD 
Hendrik Hart 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Herman Dooyeweerd's New Critique of 
Theoretical Thought in 1985 and the 10th anniversary of his death in 1987, I explore his 
theory of theory. Dooyeweerd distinguished theory as conceptual knowledge of abstracted 
functions from everyday knowing as integrated knowledge of wholes. He tried to show 
that critical theorizing requires philosophical integration, self-awareness, and religious 
knowledge of the origin of ourselves and creation. In the course of developing his view 
Dooyeweerd touched on many issues that are still current for us today, in particular issues 
around foundationalism. A brief evaluation in the context of our contemporary philosoph-
ical scene closes the essay. 
The year 1985 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Christian 
philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd's three volume magnum opus, A New Critique 
of Theoretical Thought, first published in Dutch in 1935, later in English in 
1953. 1 Dooyeweerd, who lived from 1894-1977, was a Dutch philosopher, 
according to some the most important philosopher in Holland since Spinoza. His 
influence extends far beyond that small European country, however, and North 
America is one area where scholars have found Dooyeweerd's thought to be 
worthwhile. 2 It would seem appropriate, therefore, that especially Christian phi-
losophers take note of Dooyeweerd' s work at this time, more than a decade after 
his death and over half a century after the appearance of a seminal and original 
philosophical work by a contemporary philosopher whose influence, although 
limited to a small number of philosophers in North America, is nevertheless 
perceptible. In general one might say that awareness of Dooyeweerd's work is 
concentrated among scholars who are interested in connections between knowl-
edge and religious belief and who have an affinity for thinking about these 
epistemic connections within certain Calvinian traditions. 
The theme from Dooyeweerd's work I propose to introduce here is that of his 
Gegenstand theory of theory. 3 I chose this theme because the magnum opus takes 
its title from a focus on theoretical thought. Not only is this theory one of the 
better known and more controversial of his views among those who do know 
his work, but it is also one of the clearest links between his philosophy and his 
Calvinist heritage. Insofar as historical links between Calvinism and philosophy 
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have been especially close in certain areas of epistemology, 4 Dooyeweerd' s 
Gegenstand theory as an epistemological theory will help to see his philosophy 
as clearly embedded in his religious position. 
Introduction 
The theory can perhaps best be introduced by reference to a well known 
traditional model philosophers use to represent what goes on when people know 
something. We say that there is someone who knows, a knowing subject, as 
well as something that is known, a known object. The subject relates to the 
object in knowing it, while the object is related to the subject in being known. 
We may symbolize this as S-O. In this formula Sand 0 are on either side of a 
hyphen. They are, we say, on opposite sides of the relation, one is over against 
the other. If we want to say this in German, we can say that, since the object 
"stands over against" the subject, the object is a Gegenstand to the knower or 
subject. Following this train of thought we could be tempted to see Herman 
Dooyeweerd's Gegenstand theory as just another one in the long line of theories 
of the knower-known relation conceived as a subject-object relation. However, 
it would be a mistake to put it like this. Dooyeweerd used the German Gegenstand, 
which as a term is no more than a German translation of the Latin objectum, in 
order to be able to distinguish this Gegenstand of theoretical thought from the 
object of naive experience. 5 
Dooyeweerd made this distinction because he viewed everyday concepts (non-
abstractive)6 as very different from the highly abstract concepts of theory. In 
theoretic thinking, which he saw as dissective, he wanted to place great emphasis 
on the dis-tinctive, ab-stractive, ana-lytic, or ex-planatory character of that sort 
of knowing. In contrast, he understood everyday conceptual knowing wholisti-
cally, as in-tegrative and co-herent. In a theory, Dooyeweerd maintained, we 
have a splitting apart of reality, a dissection of the world into some of its various 
parts and dimensions. In ordinary conceptual knowing we make distinctions 
which are normally not experienced with the isolation of theoretical abstraction. 
Theoretical concepts always pick only an element, an aspect, a property, a 
structure out of the integrated complexity that is reality. Reality, characterized 
by wholeness and integration, "resists" this being taken to pieces. Dooyeweerd 
found evidence for this in his belief that no theoretical concept can really be 
understood unless we see it against the background of the original context from 
which we isolated it. 7 Dooyeweerd believed that in theoretical thought, reality 
can only be known if even in its most abstract concepts contact with the rest of 
reality remains. One might say that, if in our attempts to isolate an element of 
reality in abstraction, we sense the presence of the rest of reality in our isolated 
concept, we then have a sense of reality's "resistance" within theory. 8 
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Dooyeweerd tried to capture this sense of theoretical resistance in the term 
Gegenstand. A concept of theoretical knowledge for Dooyeweerd grasps a 
Gegenstand, that is, an abstracted, isolated dimension of reality which, because 
of this isolation, exists in tension with the reality to which it refers, as well as 
with the rest of reality from which the referent was isolated. A concept of 
everyday knowledge, in contrast, grasps an object which maintains the integrality 
of our wholistic experience of reality. Terminologically, then, there is a contrast 
between a theoretical Gegenstand and what Dooyeweerd called a naive object. 9 
Some Background 
Before I give a more detailed description and clarification of the Gegenstand 
theory I will now first present a short characterization of the problems Dooyeweerd 
hoped to be able to tackle with this theory and a brief sketch of the historical 
circumstances which set the context for these problems. 
When Dooyeweerd developed his Gegenstand theory it allowed him to make 
helpful approaches to a number of significant questions. How do we get at the 
role played by the thinker in the process of thought?1O If science is unified in its 
method, how do we account for the many different scholarly disciplines and 
how do they relate?" Is scientific knowledge a specific kind of knowledge with 
a character of its own?12 Is theoretic thinking unprejudiced, objective, or autonom-
OUS?13 With the Gegenstand theory (GT) in hand Dooyeweerd was able to formu-
late helpful answers to these problems. But why was he interested in them? 
The need to face these problems arose out of a complex background with 
religious, social, and philosophical components. From his Calvinian religious 
tradition he inherited the conviction that human life in its totality is integrally 
religious, that our choices and decisions are ultimately moulded and motivated 
by religious forces, by our relationship to what we believe to be ultimate. 14 The 
Calvinian confession of God's sovereign rule in creation implies the need for 
subjecting all of our lives, including our life of scholarship, to this rule. Knowl-
edge not guided by faith was foreign to Dooyeweerd's experience. If science 
developed out of a different set of convictions, then science must be reformed. 
Only a moment's reflection on the implications of this heritage for the questions 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph will reveal that Dooyeweerd had strong 
convictions against certain answers traditionally given to these questions. 
In the footsteps of Abraham Kuyper, founder of the Free University where 
Dooyeweerd taught all of his scholarly career, he worked on a specific theory 
to give scholarly expression to the spiritual need he saw for redirection in the 
world of science. Though he acknowledged science as having a character of its 
own that should be respected and developed, he was equally insistent that science 
not dictate to other areas of human experience; least of all in matters of truth. 
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Scientific method as supreme standard of truth or as most authentic road to 
knowledge was not something Dooyeweerd subscribed to. Nor did he believe 
that science is the supreme authority for deciding what is real. The fact that 
some belief might not pass scientific muster was not by itself reason for rejecting 
the belief, as Dooyeweerd saw it. The setting of supreme standards could for 
him only be a matter of the will of the world's Creator. Science is just one area 
of our lives. It is in no position to rule over other areas of human experience. 
Nor can, within science, one field claim to have discovered the standards to be 
followed by all other fields. 
Stimulated by these beliefs from his Calvinian tradition, Dooyeweerd deeply 
experienced his culture from the perspective of the worldview inspired by these 
beliefs. He sharply saw the need for freedom of conviction in the academy, that 
is, the need for ultimate openness in the academy, unobstructed by false notions 
of objectivity; as well as the need for the freedom of the academy to be itself 
in its relation with other social institutions. Freedom from control by political 
or ecclesiastical authority was no more essential to Dooyeweerd than freedom 
from control by the hidden agendas of unconfessed intellectual ideologies within 
the world of scholarship. Because the Free University of his day was still con-
cerned to establish its viability both as a religiously open institution among the 
religiously closed universities' of that time, and as a religiously free institution 
in relation to the church and its theologians of that day, we can in this context 
understand Dooyeweerd's concern that the proper character of theory be inves-
tigated. 
Philosophically these religious and cultural impulses come into focus in 
Dooyeweerd's lifelong struggle with the philosophical dogma, as he referred to 
it, of the pretended autonomy of theoretical thought. IS Michael Polanyi's theory 
of the scientist's indwelling in his framework of commitment, J iirgen Habermas' s 
theory of the role of human interests in science, Thomas Kuhn's theory of the 
role of paradigms in the natural sciences, and Gerard Radnitzky's theory of 
steering fields internal to science, are all prefigured in the way Dooyeweerd 
worked out his GT. In He not only saw the problems connected with rational 
autonomy very early, but he also was one of the first to formulate a comprehensive 
theory to deal with these problems. 
The Theory 
Briefly stated, Dooyeweerd approached these problems of his religious, cul-
tural, and philosophical milieu by means of the GT as follows. In order to 
overcome what he called rational autonomy we need to see that any rational 
process is a human activity. By reflecting on their role in the process people 
will detect that theory is not closed to their subjective selves. When we theoret-
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ically reflect (a rational process) on how we are present in our theorizing (theoret-
ical self-reflection), we will uncover our philosophical assumptions. That happens 
because the presence of the self in theorizing differs from that presence in the 
contextual reflection of everyday experience. Let me explain. 
For everyday thought the world about which we reflect is an intellectually 
unproblematic given.'7 For science, however, the Gegenstand is an abstract 
product of human intelligence. It is not a neutral given of observation. Having 
been removed from its context by means of logical operations, the place of the 
Gegenstand in the coherence of reality becomes a logical problem. As such this 
Gegenstand is inherently problematic and is encountered only in scientific know-
ing. The theorizing person brings coherence into that theoretically problematic 
world by means of philosophical categories, that is, ontological points of view 
which by means of concepts of totality and integration systematize the multiplicity 
of theoretical concepts into a theoretical unity. The sciences themselves, with 
their many different points of view, cannot contribute this unity, because their 
Gegenstand comes from many different fields. None of these fields has any 
primacy in the sense that anyone of them could serve to integrate all the others. 
Therefore, to get a coherent scientific view of reality, only an underlying philos-
ophy can integrate these irreducible and diverse approaches. 18 
So the first level of self-reflection in theory gets in touch with the self in terms 
of a person's assumed philosophical categories of integration. These underlying 
philosophical assumptions represent, as it were, the theoretical presence of the 
self inside the theoretical world. But in order that in its presence that self may 
become fully self-conscious, theoretical self-reflection demands philosophical 
self-reflection. Having come across the philosophical assumptions, these assump-
tions must be confronted in philosophy by the self whose points of view they 
are. And self-reflection has nowhere else to go in philosophy than to the presence 
of the self behind these assumptions in its reflection. Thus the avenue via which 
Dooyeweerd tries to undermine the autonomy of reason is that of self-critical 
reflection on the rational process. Reason, rather than being autonomous, is 
rooted in assumptions which in many instances transcend reason. The major 
exception is the assumption (not acknowledged as such) of reason rooted in 
assuming itself. But that point of view leads to major antinomies. 19 
How does the GT lead to these insights? To understand this we need an analysis 
of its main concepts and contours. The classical place is New Critique volume 
I, pages 38-55. These pages are part of the "Prolegomena" in which Dooyeweerd 
develops his transcendental critique of theoretical thought, that is, his attempt 
to show that theory, via the theorizing person, originates in religious ground 
motives, in the self's deepest ultimate motivations. It will be helpful to summarize 
the theory in the very sequence in which Dooyeweerd develops it. 
It is essential for an understanding of Dooyeweerd that we remember his stress 
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on ordered wholeness. He refers to the empirical universe as an integral totality, 
whose order gives that universe the reality of cosmic coherence.(4)20 In that 
cosmic coherence we find two foci for our awareness, the one of individually 
existing entities in their relations (covered in volume IllY! , the other of the many 
kinds of properties which these individuals and their relations have (treated in 
volume 11). Thus, Dooyeweerd's theory is a classical theory of "particular sub-
stances" and the "attributes" they have. The attributes, to which Dooyeweerd 
mostly refers as the functions which things have, can be categorized according 
to him in terms of a number of irreducible levels of functions. There are many 
attributes (properties, qualities, functions) which things have. But all of them 
are of some kind or other. And these kinds finally yield a number of mutually 
irreducible ultimate kinds. Dooyeweerd calls these ultimate kinds the irreducible 
modal dimensions of our universe.(4) These modal dimensions are the focus for 
theoretical knowledge,22 while the individual entities in their interrelations are 
the focus for ordinary knowledge.(38) So theoretical thought or science is func-
tionally oriented, while everyday thought is focussed on actual wholes or con-
cretely interrelated individual entities. 23 
Another way of drawing attention to this functional focus of theory is to refer 
to that focus as antithetical.(39) In this context "antithetical" does not have the 
religious sense in which Dooyeweerd also and more prominently uses the term, 
namely to indicate the religious irreconcilability of opposing ultimate directions 
in life. Dooyeweerd calls the theoretical focus antithetic, because he wants to 
draw attention to the fact that, in his view, theory typically juxtaposes functions 
of one irreducible kind (the logical functions ofthe analytic aspect of our thinking) 
to abstracted functions of another irreducible kind (say, organic functions if the 
field of inquiry happens to be biology). 
Dooyeweerd's most frequent reference to this use of antithesis is to what he 
calls the opposition of logical and non-logical functions. By logical he means 
human conceptual, rational, intellectual functions. By non-logical he means other 
functions we or other entities may have, such as metabolism, sensitivity, skills, 
morality, and so on. Because our concepts are usually concepts of other than 
conceptual reality, Dooyeweerd speaks of a conceptual versus non-conceptual 
or logical versus non-logical opposition. 
This antithetical attitude in theory creates a tension between our conceptual 
operations and their Gegenstand, that is, between our analysis and the functional 
field on which we conceptually operate. The functional field enters into our 
theory as an abstraction. And the making of abstractions creates tensions caused 
by the breaking up of the original cosmic coherence within which the abstracted 
functions have their actual reality. 24 
So according to Dooyeweerd the sorts of properties typically investigated in 
one irreducible field of science, that is, the functions of the mode on which we 
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concentrate our theoretical attention, "resist" being separated from their original 
context. (40) This problem of opposition and resistance does not occur in everyday 
ihinking, because ordinarily our thinking remains embedded in the context in 
which it occurs. But theoretical concepts cause us problems, because they are 
synthetic constructions. (41-44 )25 They are taken out of their cosmic coherence. 
The synthetic theoretical concept is the focal point for the problems 
Dooyeweerd sees here. For one thing, there is the opposition between our logical 
or conceptual functions on the one hand, and the functions of another irreducible 
mode of functioning on the other. If there is to be a concept, that is, a logical 
grasping of what is a (usually) non-logical order, that opposition will have to 
be overcome. For another, once we have analytically resolved the complex reality 
we are investigating into simpler components, the logical-conceptual point of 
view does not as such offer any clues as to how the theoretical synthesis must 
be accomplished. The coherence of certain kinds of properties in a certain kind 
of entity is usually not a logical matter. Further, argues Dooyeweerd, the concep-
tual synthesis cannot possibly come from just one of the originally opposed 
poles. The theoretical concept of a cell, for example, is neither a purely logical 
reality nor a purely organic reality. It is, as we say, a bio-Iogical concept. How 
is that concept possible?(45) 
At this point Dooyeweerd makes one of his most important moves in the GT. 
Since theoretical thought is essentially antithetical in its opposition of logical to 
nonlogical functionality, he argues, any synthesis will have to originate outside 
of that opposition. So for Dooyeweerd this means the theoretical synthesis must 
originate somewhere outside of theory. (46) Against Descartes Dooyeweerd main-
tains that theory left on its own could never, once having analytically resolved 
something into its conceptual' components, succeed in rebuilding reality in a 
purely logical way. To be successful theory needs to go outside of itself for its 
basic clues, True concepts require an extra-theoretical element. But to make that 
extra-theoretical element theoretically operative it needs to enter into theory. 
How is that to be accomplished? 
Dooyeweerd goes on to argue that, within theory, we need a theoretical view 
of the whole of reality which lies outside of theory and from which we make 
the theoretical abstraction. Only the availability within theory of the original 
coherence provides us with a viewpoint from which we can make the synthesis 
which occurs in a theoretical concept. A theoretical total view is required.(49) 
And this is where philosophy comes in. Philosophy, according to Dooyeweerd, 
ought to be theoretical reflection directed toward the totality of cosmic coher-
ence.(4) This, however, will not become really clear to us unless we become 
aware of the fact that theoretical analysis is not just an abstracted logical process 
resulting in concept formation. Rather, theoretical analysis is a real, actual, 
concrete act of a human person. As a concrete act analysis has, besides logical 
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functions, many more functions of different kinds. And the act is performed by 
an individual person whose functions these are. 
The importance of this lies in the fact that the theorizing person, in having a 
philosophical point of view, thereby is able to bring a total view of reality inside 
the theoretical arena. Thus, in the unity of the person theoretical thought becomes 
unified. Or rather, it can become so unified. For that to actually happen, we 
need to become conscious of our philosophical viewpoine6 and even go beyond 
that to engage in critical self-reflection. The person or community who critically 
reflect on a philosophical point of view will need to push on to confront the 
very self or selves-in-community who are responsible for having that point of 
view. If we concentrate thought on ourselves who think, we will enable ourselves 
to direct thought to its underlying unity in the human self.(50-51, 5) 
Thus Dooyeweerd wants to make a case for the fact that truly successful 
theoretical concept formation requires self-knowledge. Though this need not be 
the case for every scientist, Dooyeweerd certainly thought it needed to be true 
for a scientific community as a whole. The necessary self-awareness that leads 
to philosophical awareness must go beyond philosophy, urging the scientific 
community to ask: who are we? who-in-the-world are we? what-in-the-world is 
our task? who are the "we" asking these questions? Such self-knowledge is only 
possible in knowing one's origin, religiously speaking. If he were writing today, 
Dooyeweerd would almost certainly say that our fundamental theoretical notions 
are linked to our fundamental commitments to what we take to be the ultimate 
basis for reality. Religious self-knowledge, for Dooyeweerd, is knowing our-
selves in knowing our God whose revelation we accept about who we are called 
to be. 
And so Dooyeweerd concludes that the theoretical enterprise has religious 
roots.(52-55 and 7-12, 15-16) He arrives at that conclusion by analyzing the 
consequences of his view that theoretical thought is bound to an antithesis of 
logical and nonlogical functions. Let me briefly summarize the point of the 
preceding pages once more. In order to overcome this antithesis we need a 
synthesis to form a logical concept of a nonlogical Gegenstand. For the synthesis 
we need a theoretical view of the unity and totality of the world. We require, 
that is, an ontology, or cosmology, or metaphysic. 
Such a totality view, in his analysis, requires self-awareness in philosophy. 
Self-awareness, in turn, requires religious awareness of our own and the world's 
origin. It requires religious awareness because we need to come face to face 
with the source of all knowledge in revelation, which requires knowledge to be 
rooted in the religious attitude of hearing what is revealed. Both self-awareness 
and religious awareness, however, lie outside the boundaries of theory. Thus, 
since theory requires the extra-theoretical to be successful as theory, reason in 
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theory is not autonomous. Kant was mistaken in saying that in theory reason is 
autonomous. We need a new critique of theoretical thought. 
Evaluation 
Of course, this brief summary cannot do justice to Dooyeweerd's elaborate 
treatment of the GT in various contexts. But enough of it has emerged here to 
allow us, by way of descriptive summary, to make some general evaluative 
comments about the GT. Perhaps the most serious problem is Dooyeweerd's 
lasting satisfaction with the insight that there is a structural difference between 
theoretical thought and naive or everyday thought. He insisted that the use of 
our conceptual functions in theory differs in principle from their use in other 
contexts. He never questioned either this insight or his formulation of it. Yet 
other formulations were in tension if not direct conflict with his articulation of 
the difference in question here. 
One such conflict arises when we critically question his view of philosophy 
as theory. As theory, philosophy must remain bound to the antithetical attitude 
and thus be bound also to a dissected universe. As philosophy, however, this 
theory must be occupied with coherence and even totalityY That tension is never 
satisfactorily resolved. The conflict is visibly present in Dooyeweerd's admission 
of a structural Gegenstand, that is, one which rather than being modal is the 
abstracted grasp of the typical structure of a totality or whole. (Volume II, page 
469.) Thus, the view of the Gegenstand as necessarily modal in character (39-40) 
is abandoned in later volumes. But the consequences of that move for earlier 
formulations are apparently not considered. 
In addition to his insufficiently developed concept of the Gegenstand 
Dooyeweerd also did not analyze his concept of naive experience in great detail. 
It never becomes really clear whether there is a difference between naive thought 
and naive experience. As a result there is hardly any place in the New Critique 
where Dooyeweerd thoroughly examines naive thought as thought, that is, as 
conceptual in nature. 28 That all thinking, as conceptual, might necessarily be 
abstractive and therefore characterized by tension, is not only not acknowledged 
by him, but also never considered. As a result the inner connections between 
his notions of the object of naive thought and of the Gegenstand of theoretical 
analysis are not brought to light. 
Experience, knowledge, and thought are not, as a whole, clearly distinguished 
by Dooyeweerd, even though he does make a very sharp distinction between 
two kinds of thought. But that sharp distinction itself becomes fuzzy when related 
to the lack of broader distinctions. 29 One may appreciate the distinction between 
scientific thought and other forms of awareness, while yet expecting a more 
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defined concept of just with what in those forms of awareness scientific thinking 
needs to be contrasted. 
Contributions 
It would not be difficult to add to the list of problems in connection with 
Dooyeweerd's theory of theory.30 But there are also obvious contributions to be 
appreciated. From a contemporary point of view it must immediately become 
evident that the GT is relevant to a number of issues in today's thinking about 
theory. Examples are presentday reflection on the relativity of apriori logical 
analyses,}l on the role of extra conceptual factors in theoretical inquiry, and on 
the relation of rationality and nonrational elements in our experience. Our exp-
loration of these issues can benefit from a consideration of many cogent arguments 
in Dooyeweerd's analysis. He deals extensively with the limitations of apriori 
arguments, with the role of the non-theoretical in theory, and with the relation 
of conceptual and non-conceptual functions in experience. In that sense his 
fifty-year old theory is a contemporary theory. 
Another example is that the GT provides arguments for the necessary relation 
of theory to practical issues of relevance in a culture. Insofar as our present 
climate calls for the social relevance of theory we can say that the GT fits that 
climate. More than that, Dooyeweerd has clearly laid bare connections between 
theory and the ultimate commitments of the people who theorize. 32 In that way 
he has not only given concrete theoretical articulation to a long held view about 
religion and theory in his own religious tradition, which up to the formulation 
of his theory had remained largely intuitive,}} but he also contributed to the 
re-emergence in that tradition (Calvinian thought) of reflection on the religious 
roots of our culture and on the need to act on the basis of one's fundamental 
convictions. 3. 
Dooyeweerd's contribution to our reflection on the present state of philosophy 
is also important. By putting great stress on the analytic character of conceptual 
inquiry, that is, by showing that analysis is essentially a process of taking 
something apart into its elements, Dooyeweerd provided an explanation for why 
the theoretical enterprise, if left without philosophical integration, must disinteg-
rate. The GT allows us to understand the fragmentary character of contemporary 
scholarship. In Dooyeweerd's view the rejection of "metaphysical" philosophy 
by the academic disciplines as irrelevant must result in the drifting apart of these 
disciplines from one another as well as within their own territories, since they 
themselves lack an inner point of integration. At the same time, it provides a 
rationale for the rehabilitation of philosophy,}5 since philosophy is identified as 
the discipline which provides the context within which science can achieve 
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integration. 
In addition, the GT provides concepts that can help us contribute to the recovery 
of philosophy itself. If a return to wholistic emphases and to totality concepts 
is indeed a recovery, then the GT does have contributions to make in this context. 
When, under the pressure of positivism and the analytic tradition, philosophy 
as a totality discipline gave way to philosophy as analytic technique and as 
method for the precise determination of isolated abstractions, the philosophical 
task of providing a general picture of the total framework of empirical existence 
seemed to fall into disrepute. The GT shows that such an attitude is not necessary. 36 
Another lasting contribution to thinking about theory is that besides emphasis 
on the analytic character of theory, the GT also places emphasis on the synthetic 
character of theory. In the GT we find an elaborate ontological framework for 
the GOdelian thesis that theoretical systems as formal systems are in principle 
incomplete. 37 From within theory we cannot satisfactorily complete the theoretical 
picture. Such an insight undermines the idea that in theory we have a view of 
reality as it "really" is, as well as the idea that theoretical truth is truth par 
excellence. Further, amled with the conviction that the theoretical enterprise as 
a whole is synthetic,38 we are challenged to look for the extra-theoretical factors 
needed to complete theory. To use a tum of phrase: Dooyeweerd would say that 
analytic truth (as in the analytic tradition) is by definition synthetic (as in artifacted 
by reason) and can thus never be significantly true as such, by itself. 
Dooyeweerd, almost thirty years before Polanyi's Personal Knowledge made 
its appearance, forcefully advanced the conviction that knowledge, including 
theoretical knowledge, is personal. No knowledge is possible, according to 
Dooyeweerd, except as the knowledge of persons and with the involvement of 
these persons noticeable within theory. And in that conviction he included the 
notion that persons can only be themselves in commitment. 
Dooyeweerd's examination of the antithetic or analytic direction in thought 
in its relation to the synthetic direction reinforces the concept of the relativity 
of the rational dimension of human experience. Rational knowing is meaningful 
only in relation to the rest of experience. When it is apriori in the sense of 
divorced from the rest of experience it cannot count on being genuinely mean-
ingful or true. Thus the relativity of rationality in Dooyeweerd is contrasted with 
its autonomy in the tradition of rationalism. Dooyeweerd never subscribed to 
the isolated and substantivized view of our conceptual faculties which is so 
characteristic of all who believe in reason. 39 He rejected the notion of a mind or 
of a reason as a mental substance. His examination of the uncritical dogma of 
the autonomy of reason led him to a theory of the relativity of our rational 
knowing. By demonstrating this relativity he showed both that reason is neither 
the origin of truth or reality, 40 nor autonomous (and certainly not the measure 
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of the rest of the world),.l and that rational procedures can be authentic only in 
integral relation to the other dimensions of human experience and to the world 
about which we reason.42 
Institute for Christian Studies 
NOTES 
I. This roughly 2000 page treatise was first put out in Amsterdam by H. J. Paris in three volumes, 
appearing from 1935 to 1936. The English translation was a genuinely new edition with new material 
added. [t was put out by the Presbyterian and Refomled Publishing Company of Philadelphia in 
four volumes, appearing between 1953 and 1958. The fourth volume, which was new, was an 
extensive index. In 1969 a reprint of all four volumes was bound in a set of two volumes. The same 
two volume set was reprinted again in 1983 and made available by Paideia Press of Jordan Station, 
Ontario, Canada. 
2. See C. T. Mcintire's "Herman Dooyeweerd in North America" in David F. Wells, editor, 
Reformed Theology in America. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985, pp. 172-185.) 
3. The Gegenstand theory is a transcendental theory, describing the conditions which make theory 
possible. 
4. John Calvin's connection of self knowledge and knowledge of God is one such link, Calvinists' 
suspicions of reason is another. The voluntarist position that God is not bound by laws of logic also 
finds strong support in certain Calvinist traditions. The work of contemporary theologians such as 
Karl Barth, Gerrit Berkouwer, and Hendrikus Berkhof provides ample evidence of these traditions. 
For a recent exploration of these connections see Alvin Plantinga's paper "The Refomled Objection 
to Natural Theology" in Proceedings o(the American Catholic Philosophical Association 15 (1980): 
49-62. 
5. The Latin also has the sense of something placed (thrown even) before us, standing out there 
before us. The German is an etymologically precise translation. So is the Dutch "voorwerp." But 
both the English and Dutch terms were too far removed in their present meaning to remind the reader 
immediately of this "outstanding" character of what we think about. And since that aspect in the 
knower known relation in theory is what especially attracted Dooyeweerd, he chose the German 
term because of its greater clarity. Purely verbally, object and Gegenstand have identical meaning. 
See New Critique I, p. 40 for the Gegenstand as "opposite." 
6. Dooyeweerd uses a fairly large number of different expressions to stand for the same reality as 
synonyms. Some of these are "naive," "every day," and "ordinary," while others used in combination 
with these are "concepts," "thinking," and "knowing." But it also appears that he often distinguishes 
sharply within the second group. Such usage, of course, can lead to confusion. Later in the paper 
I will come back to this. Up to that point I will follow Dooyeweerd's own usage of interchangeability 
among these expressions. 
7. There are definite parallels here with the functions of the "tacit dimension" in the thought of 
Michael Polanyi, as worked out by him in various places but perhaps best accessible in the opening 
pages of Personal Knowledge. (Various editions. For the publishing history see page iv in the Harper 
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Torchbook edition, New York, Harper and Row, 1964. xvi, 428 pp.) 
8. Unusual though this talk about "resistance" may be, the expression is authentically Dooyeweerdian 
and its meaning will become clearer later on. 
9. Dooyeweerd's use of "object" is both traditional and untraditional, for which reason his statements 
about objects can be confusing. Traditional is his insistence that what is objective about objects is 
that they are what they are "objectively" in the sense of the same for all normal observers. But at 
the same time no object for Dooyeweerd is merely something out there. For him its being objective 
is always related to the functions of a subject. The development of that latter doctrine is highly 
untraditional. A further confusion is, of course, the fact that the English term object is as much a 
translation of the Latin objectum as the German term Gegenstand. 
10. He asked this question because, long before Polanyi's Personal Knowledge appeared, 
Dooyeweerd was persuaded that dealing with the process of abstraction apart from the person 
abstracting would be dealing with that process, mistakenly, as though it were itself an abstraction. 
11. As an anti reductionist, Dooyeweerd was opposed to letting one method of one science stand 
model for all the rest. He was a methodological pluralist. But he also wished to stress the interrelated-
ness and unity of all methods of science. 
12. He intuitively opposed the idea of science as the perfection of all knowledge. 
13. Well before Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979) the concept of reason as the judge of all culture by means of its permanent neutral 
matrix for all knowing was rejected by Dooyeweerd. 
14. For a similar conviction in the same tradition see Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason within the 
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976). 
15. What is called foundationalism today is closely related to what Dooyeweerd referred to as the 
autonomy of reason. This whole approach to theory was suspect to him as an uncritically adopted 
prejudice. Long before that tradition of centuries became questionable to philosophers in general-as 
it has for the last two or three decades-Dooyeweerd developed the GT in order to expose the 
fallacies of this unexamined dogma. 
16. Polanyi's theory is analogous to Dooyeweerd's insistence on the inescapability of the religious 
motivations of a thinker finding their way into unavoidable ideas regarding the totality of reality 
which fundamentally determine that thinker's outlook. Habermas's theory is present in Dooyeweerd's 
insistence that each thought community is compelled to follow the leads of their deepest convictions 
about humanity's place in the world. Kuhn's and Radnitzky's theories have their parallel in 
Dooyeweerd's view that all science occurs within ontological frameworks. There are, of course, 
many differences. Butt he fundamental insights are strongly analogous and point to similar states of 
affairs. See Clarence W. Joldersma, "Beliefs And The Scientific Enterprise: A Framework Model 
Based On Kuhn's Paradigms, Polanyi's Commitment Framework, And Radnitzky's Internal Steering 
Fields." Master Of Philosophy thesis, Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, 1982. 
17. Dooyeweerd literally means intellectually unproblematic, not unproblematic in every sense. 
Naive experience can have all sorts of problems. But the object of naive experience or everyday 
thought does not present us with the typical logical-analytical problems we encounter when we 
engage in theoretical abstraction. 
18. In Dooyeweerd's classification of the sciences he takes the point of view that all fundamental 
fields are characterized by a property that is irreducible to the properties characterizing other fields. 
Thus he would say that the biological sciences are determined in their approach by life, whereas 
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the physical sciences are thus determined by energy; in such a way that life and energy are irreducible 
properties. 
19. Many contemporary refutations of foundationalism are related to the discovery that the rational 
enterprise cannot rationally and coherently be claimed to be its own foundation. 
20. A reference like this refers to a page or pages in volume I of Dooyeweerd's New Critique. 
21. Rocks, trees, insects, tools, people, governments, churches. 
22. See note 18, above. This functional focus or orientation is not the same as a theoretical field's 
referent. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between a theory's "point of view" or orientation within reality 
on the one hand, and its subject matter on the other. Its referent is the order of a field, its coherent 
system of laws, regularities, etc. Biology's point a/view is "life" while its subject matter is general 
patterns of regularity in reality seen from that point of view. 
23. So science as functionally oriented takes its point of view in life, or energy, or space, or 
sensitivity. All of these are functions or kinds of functions of things, of entities. But they are not 
themselves things that can have such functions. Plants (things) can live (function that way). Living 
is not something done by life. People (things) can think (function that way). Thinking is not something 
done by thought. The things that do the functioning are the wholes, the concretely individual entities. 
24. One can easily and unproblematically "take hold" of a plant. There is nothing "unreal" in that. 
But to "grasp" photosynthesis "in general," i.e., to understand this process via a concept of it, is 
far less easy and far more problematic. Many of our concepts and theories are subject to controversy 
and rejection or revision. And "the man in the street" tends to have an "unreal" feeling when scholars 
discuss concepts. Reality as they know it makes these abstractions seem unreal. These are the 
phenomena Dooyeweerd refers to as theoretical problems and resistances. See also notes 5, 7, and 
17, above. 
25. Terms like analysis and synthesis have a more Cartesian ring to it in Dooyeweerd than the later 
Kantian and positivistic or analytic meaning we know so well in our contemporary discussions. 
Analytic refers to the resolution of complex concepts into their distinct conceptual components, 
while synthetic refers to the conceptual recombination of these simpler distinctions. See also the 
second half of the opening paragraph of this section. 
26. Most scientists will tend not to be conscious of their philosophical bias. But through education, 
adoption of paradigms, and in many other ways they do operate from the vantage point of such a bias. 
27. Hence the fairly obvious question: can philosophy be genuine theory? If so, how can it transcend 
diversity; or how then is theory in principle diversity oriented? 
28. But see volume II, p. 432. 
29. If one tries to imagine how Dooyeweerd might have cleared up this difficulty, every answer 
raises new problems. E.g., if naive experience is intended to be the same as naive thought, then all 
experience becomes some sort of thought. For the contemporary reader, given the author is no longer 
alive, it is best to accept that the terminology is not precise or well defined on this point and that 
the context will have to determine what is intended. As a result, the same term can in different 
contexts have quite different meanings. 
30. By using this expression I do not intend to suggest that the GT is in fact a complete theory of 
theory, but only that, as a theory, it deals with theory, though not perhaps with all of what theory 
is about. 
31. What I mean here is that even among those who accept the validity of apriori arguments for 
empirical situations, there are those who claim that this validity is relative to other factors outside 
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of logic. See, e.g., D. M. Armstrong's views on the use of apriori arguments in determining what 
universals there are: in the introduction to the first volume of his Universals and Scientific Realism 
(2 volumes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
32. As described above: by linking theory to the theorizing person and the theorizing person to 
religious commitment. 
33. Dooyeweerd's views on the religious connections within theory have always been present in 
Calvinism; see, e.g., Hendrik Hart, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Johan van der Hoeven, eds." Ration· 
ality in the Calvinian Tradition (Washington, D.C.. University Press of America, 1983). See also 
note 14, above. 
34. Reformed Christians who came to Canada shortly after World War II who invested much energy 
in the establishment of cultural organizations in education (Curriculum Development Center), labor 
(Christian Labor Association of Canada), politics (Citizens for Public Justice), the arts (Patmos Art 
Gallery), or theory (Institute for Christian Studies) often traced much of their inspiration directly or 
indirectly to the work of Dooyeweerd. 
35. This rehabilitation is not, of course, a matter of a total reintroduction. But as a theoretical 
discipline which has something of relevance to offer to all of the disciplines of the modem academy, 
philosophy needs rehabilitation. It needs to take itself seriously as an integrative force and, having 
thus returned to what Dooyeweerd would call its original and legitimate vocation, it needs to make 
itself serviceable in the academy. Kai Nielsen's Presidential address to the 1984 meeting of the 
Canadian Philosophical Association in Guelph seemed to me to be an invitation to philosophers in 
this direction. (See "On Finding One's Feet in Philosophy: From Wittgenstein to Marx." In 
Metaphilosophy, Vol. 16, No. I, January 1985, pp, I-II.) 
36. Dooyeweerd would say that his analysis demonstrates the possibility to combine serious theory 
with wholistic emphases and that in order to be empirical and scientific, philosophy need not go 
into the fragmenting and isolating direction of the analytic tradition. 
37. Kurt Giidel's Incompleteness Theorem does not strictly teach this, of course. But various authors, 
including Michael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge, have taken the theorem to imply this. 
38. See note 25, above. Synthetic also means, of course, artificial, which comes closer to 
Dooyeweerd's meaning than the more common meaning of the term in analytic philosophy. 
39. In this respect Dooyeweerd's views of the main Western tradition on rationality have much in 
common with Richard Rorty's views in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
40, The Cartesian view of reason. 
41. Autonomous in the sense of subject to no authority except its own, while perhaps being authorita-
tive for the rest of experience. 
42. The fact that reason can argue for the non-autonomy of reason is not a contradiction, To argue 
that argument does not have the last word is not the same as abandoning argument, but only to 
substitute arguing with humility for arguing with mistaken pride. 
